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 Rational Choice, Preferences over Actions and Rule-Following Behavior 
 
Viktor J. Vanberg 
 
       “Man is as much a rule-following 
animal as a purpose-seeking one.” 
      F.A. Hayek 1973: 11 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economists’ seemingly unshakable loyalty to rational choice theory is presumably due in 
no small part to the fact that, in its most general version, it is of considerable intuitive 
appeal. Its claim that in going about their lives people do what, in the situations they are 
confronted with, they consider most preferable, in terms of their own standards of 
evaluation, is not only extremely plausible, but it seems impossible to even think of 
human action in any other way. How could we make sense of each other’s actions if we 
were not to assume that people behave in ways that, in their own judgment, are preferable 
to the alternatives that they consider? In fact, it seems outright impossible for us even to 
imagine someone acting differently from what, among his available options, appears to 
him preferable.1  
A theory for which we cannot even imagine contradicting evidence, that is 
compatible with everything that might conceivably happen, has a drawback, though. It 
can be of no help whatsoever in explaining real world events. It is irrefutable because it 
has no empirical content and, hence, no explanatory power (Popper 1980: 119ff.). If 
rational choice theory is to be able to explain real world phenomena, empirical content 
must somehow be infused into it in the form of assumptions that go beyond the 
irrefutable claim that people choose what they prefer, assumptions that rule out events as 
factually impossible that are conceivable. Implicitly and explicitly economists who 
wanted to offer more than exercises in pure tautological transformation have always 
                                                 
1  This observation prompted Ludwig von Mises (1949: 18) to conclude: “Human action is 
necessarily rational. The term ‘rational action’ is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such.” 
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included such assumptions in their rational choice accounts. The purpose of this paper is 
to discuss some of the content-enriching strategies employed in economic versions of 
rational choice theory and their shortcomings, with a particular focus on the role of rule 
following in human conduct. 
 
2. Rationality Principle and Rationality Hypotheses in Economics 
What I have referred to above as the most general form of rational choice theory may be 
called the rationality principle (Vanberg 2004a). It essentially claims that individuals act 
in ways that are consistent with their beliefs about how the world works and their 
preferences over the states of the world that they expect to result from the different 
courses of action available to them. What courses of action individuals perceive as 
available options, what they believe to result from these options, and which outcome they 
prefer over all others are all subjective matters, present in a person’s mind and not 
observable from the outside. In the absence of independent evidence, an observer who 
infers a person’s beliefs and preferences from her behavior can ‘explain’ every 
conceivable action, including the most absurd, by hypothesizing beliefs and preferences 
that are consistent with the action. To the extent that action-independent evidence of a 
person’s beliefs and preference is available such ‘explanations’ may be refutable. Yet, the 
refutation concerns only the specific assumptions made about the content of a person’s 
beliefs and preferences in the particular instance. The rationality principle itself, i.e. the 
general claim that people act in subjectively consistent ways, remains totally unaffected 
by such refutation. 
 If one wants to turn the rationality principle itself into a refutable conjecture, into 
an empirically refutable rationality hypothesis (Vanberg 2004a), one has to place general 
bounds on the assumptions about people’s beliefs and preferences that are admitted in 
explanations. In other words, one has to rule out – if not the existence, at least the 
explanatory relevance of – certain kinds of beliefs and preferences. Neoclassical 
economics has responded to this challenge by modeling humans as maximizers of their 
utility function,2 where the latter reflects their preferences and the ‘maximizing’ is meant 
                                                 
2  The founding father of the neoclassical paradigm, Léon Walras, noted: “In our theory each trader 
may be assumed to determine his own utility or want function as he pleases. Once these curves have been 
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to imply that they act on adequate theories about what are efficient ways to accomplish 
their goals. While there may still be room for interpretation regarding what ‘adequate 
beliefs’ is exactly meant to entail and how utility functions are to be specified, a standard 
assumption in neoclassical theorizing has been that economic agents act on perfect 
knowledge of the relevant aspects of their environment, and that their utility function is 
essentially about the (material) payoffs that they expect for themselves from their actions.  
It is this model of perfectly rational and self-interested behavior3 that has long 
since been, and continues to be, the principal target of criticism.4 From Thorsten Veblen’s 
early biting critique5 to the more recent critique coming from the behavioral and 
experimental camps within economics,6 fundamental doubts have always been voiced 
about the realism of the view of human behavior that this model embodies. To such 
critique economists have responded essentially in one of two ways. They have either 
insisted that its lack of ‘realism’ does not prevent the maximization model from serving 
its explanatory purposes quite well. Or they have sought to add realism to their theories 
by revising the core assumptions of traditional neoclassical theory. In the remainder of 
this section I shall look at the most prominent example of the first kind of response, 
namely Milton Friedman’s (1953) defense of unrealistic ‘as if’ assumptions. As an 
                                                                                                                                                 
determined, we show how prices result from them under a hypothetical régime of absolutely free 
competition” (Walras 1954: 256). – Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 343) points out that Walras’ s 
successor on the Lausanne chair, Vilfredo Pareto, “overtly claimed, (that) once we have determined the 
means at the disposal of the individual and obtained ‘a photograph’ of his tastes … the individual may 
disappear.” 
3  The term ‘self-interested behavior’ is more appropriate in this context than the often used term 
‘selfish behavior’ because the attribute ‘selfish’ carries with it certain (negative) connotations that bias the 
issue. It implies assumptions about the ways in which persons go about seeking to ‘maximize their utility’ 
that need not be entailed at all in a theory that supposes humans to rationally pursue their self-interest. 
While a selfish person may indeed be a “rational fool” (Sen 1977), a self-interested person need not be. 
4  For a review of critiques of the rationality assumption see Vanberg 2002; 2004a. 
5  Veblen (1993: 138f.): „The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of 
pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of 
stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. … Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins 
symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, 
whereupon he follows the line of the resultant. … Spiritually, the hedonistic man is not a prime mover.” 
6  V. Smith (2003: 480) noted in his Nobel lecture: “Psychologists and ‘behavioral economists’ who 
study decision behavior almost uniformly report results contrary to rational theory. … (T)he focus on 
‘anomalies,’ beginning in the 1970’s, converted the emerging discovery enterprise into a search for 
contradictions between reports of behavior and the caricatures of mainstream theory that constitute so much 
of its core.” – For references to research findings that “contradict the neoclassical model of rational choice” 
see e.g. McFadden 1999 and 2005: 12ff.. 
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example of the second kind of response I shall discuss in section 3 arguments that have 
more recently gained prominence in behavioral and experimental economics. 
There are surely few arguments in modern economics that have been more 
intensely debated than Milton Friedman’s claim, put forward in his 1953 essay on “The 
Methodology of Positive Economics,” that unrealistic ‘as if’ assumptions are legitimate 
scientific tools as long as they yield workable predictions (Mäki, ed., 2007). I shall 
concentrate my comments on a few aspects of the issue that are of direct relevance in the 
present context. 
To be noted first is the ambiguity inherent in Friedman’s use of the term 
‘assumption.’ If one accepts, as Friedman presumably would have, the argument – made 
by K.R. Popper (1972: 351) and others – that to provide a scientific explanation means to 
logically derive an explicandum from an explanans, it should be obvious that the 
explanans must include two different kinds of ‘assumptions,’ namely general conjectures 
or hypotheses (assumptions of type 1) and assumptions about the specific initial and 
boundary conditions that characterize the case under examination (assumptions of type 
2). Whether a deliberate use of ‘unrealistic assumptions’ can be a legitimate strategy in 
the enterprise of science is a question that must surely be answered differently, depending 
on whether assumptions of type 1 and type 2 are concerned.7 The three examples that 
Friedman draws on in support of the “maximization-of-returns hypothesis” (Friedman 
1953: 22) in economics are critically different in this regard.  
The first example is about the claim that in many instances we can explain the fall 
of bodies in actual atmosphere quite well in terms of the law of gravity, even though that 
law is stated for conditions of vacuum (ibid.: 18). The ‘unrealism’ in this example clearly 
does not concern the conjectures employed (assumption type 1), as we surely consider the 
law of gravity to be realistic. What is unrealistic is the assumption that the particular 
conditions under which the law is applied are equivalent to a vacuum (assumption type 
2).  
In Friedman’s second example, concerning the density of leaves around a tree 
(ibid.: 19f.), the situation is quite different. In this case the ‘unrealism’ does not concern 
the initial or boundary conditions (assumption type 2) but the general hypothesis 
                                                 
7  U. Mäki (2007) appears to argue along similar lines even if not in the same terms. 
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(assumption type 1) that is employed in the explanation, namely “the hypothesis that the 
leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of 
sunlight it receives” (ibid.: 19). For the question of whether in science we can afford to 
work with ‘unrealistic assumptions’ must, however, surely be answered differently when 
we talk about assumptions of type 1, i.e. the general conjectures that we employ, or 
assumptions of type 2. The pragmatic reasons that may justify unrealistic assumptions 
about initial and boundary conditions cannot be used to justify unrealistic hypotheses, at 
least not as long as we consider it the principal aim of science to develop ‘true’ theories 
of how the world works. Even though in many instances it may well be possible to 
derive, and in this sense to ‘explain,’ an explicandum from an explicans that includes an 
unrealistic as-if hypothesis (or to derive a predicandum from such a predicans), we would 
hardly consider an explanation satisfactory that is based on knowingly unrealistic, i.e. 
false conjectures. Though knowingly unrealistic hypotheses may suffice for predicting 
(or, in the sense specified, ‘explaining’) what happens, they do not provide us with any 
insight into why it happens. 
 The same objections apply to Friedman’s third example: the expert billiard player 
(ibid.: 21). Here, again, the ‘unrealism’ does not, as in the ‘gravity’ example, concern the 
assumptions about initial or boundary conditions but the general conjecture that is 
supposed to do the explaining, namely “the hypothesis that the billiard player made his 
shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas … and could then make the 
ball travel in the direction indicated by the formulas” (ibid.: 21). Even though in this case, 
as in the leaves-example, the as-if hypothesis may suffice for pragmatic predictive and 
‘explanatory’ purposes, it does not inform us about what actually accounts for the expert 
billiard player’s skills8 and, therefore, does not give an answer to the “why” question. 
And that means that as-if hypotheses cannot be part of a scientific theory that aims at 
answering “why”questions. 
 The objections raised above against the use of as-if hypotheses (by contrast to as-
if assumptions about initial or boundary conditions) apply with equal force to Friedman’s 
principal case: his defense of the “maximization-of-returns hypothesis,” the hypothesis 
                                                 
8  F.A. Hayek (1967: 44) notes in reference to Friedman’s example: “So far we are able to describe 
the character of such skills we must do so by stating the rules governing the actions of which the actors will 
usually be unaware.” 
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that businessmen “behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected 
returns … and had full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in this attempt” (ibid.: 
21). There is, however, an additional issue involved here. So far, I have neglected the fact 
that the use of as-if hypotheses raises two separate issues: first, whether the behavior 
asserted by the hypothesis actually occurs; and second, whether it occurs for the reasons 
specified. In the cases of the leaves and the expert billiard players the ‘as if’ is about the 
latter, not the first issue. It is not meant to doubt that leaves and billiard players actually 
behave as they would if the respective as-if hypothesis were true. What is unrealistic is 
the assumption that they so act for the reasons the as-if hypotheses state. In economics, 
the controversy about the rational maximization hypothesis is, however, not only about 
whether economic agents maximize for the reasons the hypothesis asserts. Rather, it is 
also about the realism of the assumption that they actually behave as they would behave 
if the as-if hypothesis were true. 
 While readily admitting that what the maximization hypothesis assumes about the 
reasons for businessmen’s behavior is unrealistic, Friedman insists that it is realistic in 
what it assumes about how they behave, employing an evolutionary selection argument in 
support of his claim: “Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be 
anything at all – habitual reaction, random chance, or whatnot. Whenever this 
determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed 
maximization of returns, the business will prosper and acquire resources with which to 
expand; whenever it does not, the business will tend to lose resources … . The process of 
‘natural selection’ thus helps to validate the hypothesis” (ibid.: 22). There are two 
problems with the ‘evolutionary’ defense of the as-if hypothesis. First, there is the issue 
of whether the selective forces that work in real world markets – rather than in the 
hypothetical world of perfect competition – exhibit sufficient strength to produce the de-
facto maximizing behavior that Friedman claims they produce. Doubts about this are 
voiced by Kenneth J. Arrow (1987: 69), surely an unbiased witness, when he argues that 
“we need not merely pure but perfect competition before the rationality hypotheses have 
their full power.”9 If, however, as Friedman’s argument implies, the maximization 
                                                 
9  What is rational for an agent to do depends, of course, not only on his preferences but also on his 
beliefs ‘about the world.’ What is at issue, therefore, is under what conditions different beliefs can survive 
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assumption is more a claim about the working properties of markets than about human 
behavior as such,10 its applicability “to all of human behavior” (Becker 1976: 8) appears 
even more doubtful than its general applicability to market behavior.11 As Arrow (ibid.) 
notes, to the extent that one moves away from the context of competitive markets “the 
rationality assumptions become strained and possibly even self-contradictory.” 
 The second problem with an evolutionary defense of the as-if hypothesis concerns 
the already-addressed issue of the actual explanatory contribution that as-if hypotheses 
can make. Even if the selective forces of evolution could justly be assumed to have 
brought about the kind of behavior the as-if hypotheses describe, a theoretical science 
could not be satisfied with explaining actual behavior in as-if terms.12 Even though 
biological evolution has ‘made’ organisms capable of coping successfully with the 
problems they face in their typical environments, biologists would surely consider it most 
unsatisfactory to confine themselves in their explanations of animal behavior to the 
‘unrealistic’ assumption that animals act as if they had perfect knowledge of the relevant 
laws of nature and acted upon them in a purposeful manner, no matter how well such as-
if assumption might work for pragmatic purposes. They would rather want to give a more 
‘realistic’ account of what the actual mechanisms are that allow animals to act in such 
ways. This is, for instance, what Ernst Mayr (1988; 1992) does with his theory of 
program-based behavior, a theory that explains adapted, purposeful behavior in terms of 
‘programs’ which – as a result of evolution and individual learning – are stored in an 
organism and that incorporate knowledge about the world.13 What makes biology a 
progressive science is that it provides ever deeper insights into the principles that govern 
the living world, searching for realistic assumptions about the actual forces at work. Had 
                                                                                                                                                 
and guide agents’ actions.  Under conditions of ‘perfect competition,’ mistaken beliefs about the world will 
be qickly corrected by learning, leading all agents to act on the same, true beliefs (Vanberg 2004a: 18ff.). 
10  Friedman’s claim is that markets work in ways that make market participants act as if they 
maximize returns. This claim must be distinguished from the tenet that markets work as if they were 
populated by rational maximizers. The difference between the two claims has been illuminated by 
experimental economists who have pointed out that the results of market experiments are in accord with 
standard competitive models even if the agents do not make decisions systematically or are even – in the 
extreme – ‘zero’ intelligence robot agents (V. Smith 2003: 468, 475). 
11  See Vanberg (2004: 5ff.) for a discussion of G.S. Becker’s defense of the rationality postulate. 
12  V. Smith (2003: 475): “And the claim that it is ‘as if’ agents had complete information, helps not 
a wit to understand the wellspring of behavior. What is missing are models of the process whereby agents 
go from their initial circumstances, and dispersed information, using the algorithms of the institution to 
update their status, and converge (or not) to the predicted equilibrium.” 
13  See Vanberg (2002: 11ff.) for a summary of Mayr’s argument. 
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biologists been satisfied with taking Darwin’s theory as an excuse to work with as-if 
hypotheses, biology's capacity to illuminate our understanding of the varieties of animal 
behavior would surely be less than it is today. Reversely, had economists not comforted 
themselves with the ‘as if’ excuse they might have arrived at more satisfactory accounts 
of economic and other social behavior than the maximization of returns hypothesis is able 
to provide. 
 
3. Adjusting the Utility Function 
The alternative to Friedman’s as-if response to the realism issue is for economists to seek 
to add realism to their behavioral model by modifying its components. There are two 
candidates for revising the notion that humans act so as to rationally maximize their 
utility. One can modify the assumption made about the content of the utility function 
and/or one can re-interpret what is precisely meant by “rational maximization.” It is quite 
apparent that economists are much more reluctant to do the latter than the former. To be 
sure, they often emphasize that their models “do not necessarily presume anything in the 
way of reasoning ability, beyond that required to understand and perform in everyday 
social context” (Henrich and others 2005), and certain modifications of the perfect 
rationality assumption, such as the concept of ‘Baysian rationality’ (Albert 2003), have 
been suggested. Yet, systematic efforts to add ‘realism’ to the economic model of man 
have been typically confined to modifications in the utility function, allowing for a 
broader variety of preferences than pure material self-interest, while maintaining the 
notion that agents maximize their utility, whatever it is they derive utility from. A 
programmatic statement of this ‘revisionist’ strategy is, for instance, Gary S. Becker’s 
(1996:4) comment on the purpose of his Accounting for Tastes: “This book retains the 
assumption that individuals behave so as to maximize utility while extending the 
definition of individual preferences to include … love and sympathy, and other neglected 
behavior.” 
 My purpose in this section is to draw attention to what, as I suppose, is a 
fundamental inconsistency in some of the more recent attempts in behavioral and 
experimental economics to account for observed behavioral ‘anomalies’ by manipulating 
the contents of the utility function. My interest here is not in the often raised issue 
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whether adjusting the utility function to accommodate observed behavior does not result 
in mere ad hoc explanations. What I am concerned with is the fact that these ‘revisionist’ 
approaches are claimed to remain within the scope of the rational choice paradigm while 
in truth they imply, as I submit and explain below, a tacit paradigmatic shift from a 
rational choice perspective to a systematically different perspective.14 
 The issue that is at stake here is hinted at in K.J. Arrow’s (1996: xiii) statement: 
“Choice is over sets of actions, but preference orderings are over consequences.” – The 
very point of rational choice theory – by contrast to alternative behavioral paradigms – is 
to explain actions exclusively in terms of the consequences  the actor expects to result 
from them. Actions are seen as pure means or instruments by which the actor seeks to 
bring about desired outcomes. His preferences over expected outcomes totally determine 
which course of action he will choose. According to the logic of rational choice theory, 
there can be no other reasons for choosing action A over action B than the agent’s 
expectation that A will result in more preferable outcomes than B. This explanatory logic 
allows one to speak of a person’s ‘preferences over actions’ as long as such preferences 
are understood as pure derivatives of her preferences over outcomes. It does not permit 
one, however, to introduce as explanatory variables preferences over actions ‘as such,’ 
i.e. preferences for acting in certain ways that a person harbors for reasons that are prior 
to and independent of her preferences for the consequences she may expect to result from 
her actions in particular instances. 
 The above argument has straightforward implications for the kind of entries that 
are admissible for inclusion in the utility function if an explanation is still to qualify as a 
rational choice account. It is precisely in this regard that, as I submit, revisionist 
proposals for a more realistically defined utility function, such as the one prominently 
advocated by Ernst Fehr, have become ambiguous if not outright inconsistent. In a 
number of (co-authored) articles15 Fehr has argued that the deviations from rational 
choice predictions that have been observed in a variety of experiments, in particular in 
ultimatum games, can be systematically accounted for if one relaxes the assumption of 
self-interest. The explanatory power of the rational choice paradigm, so he asserts, can be 
                                                 
14  On this issue see also Vanberg 2006. 
15  See e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 2003; Fehr and Falk 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2000. 
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restored if one allows for “other-regarding” or “social” preferences to be included in 
individuals’ utility functions, “in particular preferences for reciprocal fairness” (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2000: C1f.), while maintaining the assumption that agents are fully rational 
maximizers given their utility functions. Leaving aside the details of Fehr’s arguments, 
what I want to draw attention to is the ambiguity inherent in the notion of “preferences 
for reciprocal fairness” and the issue of whether including such preferences is consistent 
with the claim of providing a rational choice account.  
Of particular relevance in the present context is the fact that there is a significant 
difference between describing ‘social’ preferences, such as “preferences for reciprocal 
fairness” as concerns “about the material resources allocated to relevant reference agents” 
(ibid.) and interpreting them as a “predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-
abiding behaviors, and … a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations” 
(Fehr and Fischbacher 2003: 785). In the first interpretation, “preferences for reciprocal 
fairness” are clearly preferences for outcomes, even if they are more broadly interpreted 
to include outcomes that affect the welfare of others. It is equally clear, though, that in 
the second interpretation “preferences for reciprocal fairness” must be considered 
preferences for actions as such. After all, it is difficult to see what having a 
“predisposition” or a “propensity” to act in certain ways can mean if not that a person 
will act for reasons that are separate from the consequences to be expected in the 
particular instance. 
 There is a paradigmatic difference between explaining actions in terms of how 
agents evaluate their expected outcomes and explaining them in terms of their 
predisposition to act in certain ways in certain kinds of situations. The first explanatory 
mode is within the domain of rational choice theory, the second is not. As I shall argue in 
more detail below, to explain actions in terms of behavioral dispositions is equivalent to 
invoking, in one form or another, the notion of rule-following behavior, i.e. the notion 
that actions are carried out not for the consequences they are expected to bring about in 
the particular instance but because they are in accordance with rules that the agent is 
inclined to follow. The inclusion of such “predispositions” or “propensities” in the utility 
function means to tacitly shift from one explanatory paradigm to an entirely different 
paradigm, namely from rational choice theory to a theory of rule-following behavior. 
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 E. Fehr is surely not alone in committing the tacit paradigm shift that is at stake 
here.16 A particularly instructive example is a recent, extensive report – coauthored by a 
number of economists, including Fehr, psychologists and researchers from other fields – 
on “a cross-cultural study of behavior in Ultimatum, Public Goods, and Dictator Games 
in fifteen small-scale societies” (Henrich et al. 2005: 795). The purpose of the article is to 
add cultural variety to previous experimental studies, mostly done with students in 
modern societies, that “have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the textbook 
predictions of Homo economicus” (ibid.: 797). The authors’ principal claim is that a 
theoretical account of the observed ‘deviations’ can be provided by combining a rational 
choice approach – they call it the “preferences, beliefs and constraints approach” (ibid.: 
812) – with “insights on human motivation and reasoning from psychology and 
neuroscience … under the ultimate-level evolutionary umbrella created by culture-gene 
coevolutionary theory” (ibid.). This claim supposes that combining the different 
perspectives renders an internally consistent theoretical account. In fact, however, the 
arguments presented in the article reflect the same kind of tacit paradigm shift that I have 
identified above in Ernst Fehr’s argument. 
 The “preferences, beliefs and constraints approach” is said to be “rooted in the 
notion that individuals will select among alternatives by weighing how well the possible 
outcomes of each option meet their goals and desires. Theoretically, this is 
operationalized by assuming agents to maximize a preference function subject to 
informational and material constraints” (ibid.). Even though this statement clearly seems 
to imply that the “preferences” included as explanatory variables  are preferences over 
outcomes, the authors do, in fact, tacitly invoke preferences over actions as such when 
they note that “such considerations as fairness, sympathy, and equity are critical for 
understanding the preference functions of many people” (ibid.), and when they speak of 
“inclinations towards fairness (equity) and ‘tastes’ for punishing unfairness” (ibid.: 797). 
They tacitly shift from a rational choice outlook to a different paradigm when they speak 
of “the development of differing generalized behavioral dispositions” (ibid.: 814), when 
they argue that “norms, such as ‘treat strangers equitably’ … become goals in 
themselves” (ibid.: 813), or when they refer to “socialization theory” as a source for 
                                                 
16  For further references see Vanberg 2006. 
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understanding the “details of how norms get internalized” (ibid.). While including 
behavioral dispositions and norms surely adds explanatory power, it is misleading to 
pretend that they can be included in a rational choice framework while still maintaining 
the distinctive nature of its outlook on human action. As noted before, explaining actions 
in terms of how individuals weigh the possible outcomes of alternative options is 
categorically different from explaining them in terms of their predispositions to act in 
certain ways or their inclinations to follow internalized norms. It means to gloss over this 
fundamental difference when the authors speak of “behavioral rules (or sets of 
preferences)” (ibid.: 814) as if preferences (over outcomes) and behavioral rules were the 
same thing. 
 
4. Preferences over Actions and Rule Following 
According to its inherent logic, a rational choice approach that seeks to explain human 
behavior as the maximization of a utility or preference function has its focus on single 
acts of choice and it accounts for these acts of choice exclusively in terms of the 
consequences that potential alternative courses of actions are expected to bring about in 
the particular instance. Rational agents are assumed to decide each choice situation that 
they encounter ‘on its own merits.’  In each instance, they are predicted to choose from 
among available options the action that is predicted to result in the most preferred 
consequences. A rational choice theory, so defined, may allow for ‘altruistic’ or ‘other-
regarding’ preferences, as long as these preferences are interpreted as preferences over 
outcomes. In its purely instrumental outlook at actions it can, however, not allow for 
actions to be chosen in terms of criteria that are different from, and independent of, the 
agent’s preferences over outcomes, i.e. in terms of preferences over actions per se. Yet, 
such criteria or preferences over actions are inevitably – if only implicitly – invoked 
when “generalized behavioral dispositions” are argued to guide human behavior. The 
very point of invoking “predispositions” is to suppose that agents do not act merely in 
response to the consequences expected in particular instances, but according to 
preconceived notions of what kind of behavior is ‘appropriate’ in the type of situations 
they are facing.  
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 In a number of contributions, A. Sen has addressed the very issue that is at stake 
here, and it is instructive to take a look at his arguments. In reference to suggestions for 
how the rational choice model may be revised in order to account for observed behavior 
that appears to contradict the assumption of rational self-interest, Sen argues that a 
distinction must be drawn between accounting for sympathy and accounting for 
commitment. According to Sen, sympathy can without difficulty be accounted for within 
a rational choice framework, by broadening the concept of self-interest. “Indeed,” he 
argues, “being self-interested does not require one to be self-centered in any way, since 
one can get joys and pains from sympathy to others, and these joys and pains are 
quintessentially one’s own” (Sen 2002a: 31). Not only can concern for others be easily 
accommodated “within the utility function of the persons involved” (ibid.), concerns for 
any kind of ‘goal’ or ‘value’ that a person may be supposed to pursue can be accounted 
for in a rational choice framework, if ‘rational choice’ is defined in the minimal sense of 
maximizing an identifiable maximand. This is categorically different, though, so Sen 
insists, with commitment.17 While our everyday experience as well as many empirical 
studies “indicate that committed behavior has its actual domain” (Sen 2002a:9), it cannot 
be accounted for by standard rational choice theory, even in its minimal version.18 
Accounting for committed behavior requires one, so Sen argues, to relax even the 
assumption of “self-goal choice”, i.e. the assumption that a person’s choices reflect her 
own goals, and to allow for the pursuit of private goals to “be compromised by the 
consideration of the goals of others” (Sen 2002c: 215). 
 As commentators like Philip Pettit have noted, Sen’s claim that “people may 
become the executors of a goal-system that outruns the private goals that they endorse in 
their own name … is highly implausible” (Petit 2005: 19). After all, it is difficult to see in 
what sense human choice can be anything other than – in Sen’s terminology –“self-goal 
choice.” The difficulties inherent in Sen’s notion of ‘non-self-goal choice’ can be easily 
avoided, however, if one restates his arguments on the nature of “committed behavior” in 
                                                 
17  Sen (2002c: 214): “Sympathy – including antipathy when it is negative – refers to one person’s 
welfare being affected by the position of others…, whereas ‘commitment’ is concerned with breaking the 
tight link between individual welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action.”   
18  Sen (2005a: 8): “A reason for the importance of taking note of commitment is that it can help to 
explain many patterns of behavior that we actually observe which are hard to fit into the narrow format of 
contemporary rational choice theory.” 
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terms of the theoretical perspective that I have outlined above, a perspective that 
emphasizes the distinction between preferences over outcomes and preferences over 
actions, drawing attention to the intimate link between preferences over actions and rule-
following behavior. In fact, Sen (2002c: 214) himself invites such restatement when he 
notes that “the violation of self-goal choice” involved in commitment may “arise from 
self-imposed restrictions on the pursuit of one’s own goals (in favor of, say, following 
particular rules of conduct).”19 Apparently it is, in particular, accounting for commitment 
to rules of behavior that Sen considers a “more fundamental” challenge to standard 
rational choice accounts than accommodating other-regarding preferences or non-self 
welfare goals or values (Sen 1973: 249ff.). Accepting “certain rules of conduct as part of 
obligatory behavior” is, as he (Sen 2002c: 216f.) puts it, “not a matter of asking each 
time, What do I get out of it? How are my own goals furthered in this way?, but of taking 
for granted the case for certain patterns of behavior towards others.”20 
 Explaining actions in terms of pre-existing dispositions to follow rules rather than 
in terms of expected consequences does not mean to ignore that there are feedback effects 
of consequences on behavior. It means to redirect attention from the effects of expected 
consequences on present behavior to the effects that the actual consequences of past 
behavior have on current choices and on the effects that the actual consequences of 
current choices will have on future behavior. The behavioral dispositions that guide 
behavior at any moment in time are themselves the product of past behavioral 
consequences. They have been shaped by what agents have learned in the past – from 
direct and indirect experience – about what outcomes different kinds of behavior tend to 
produce under various kinds of circumstances. Nor does a theory of rule-following 
behavior take issue with the notion, central to rational choice theory, that human action is 
based on a ‘calculus of advantage.’ It only asserts that we must distinguish between 
different levels at which such calculus of advantage occurs, namely the level of single 
actions and the level of rules of action. It insists that, in addition to the situational 
                                                 
19  See also Sen (2002a: 7): “[A] person’s choice behavior may be constrained or influenced by the 
goals of others, or by rules of conduct…, thereby violating the self-goal choice.” – Sen (2002c: 219f.): “[A] 
rejection of self-goal choice reflects a type of commitment that is not able to be captured by the broadening 
of the goals to be pursued. It calls for behavior norms that depart from the pursuit of goals in certain 
systematic ways … and it has close links with the case for rule-based conduct, discussed by Adam Smith. 
20  Sen 2002b: 178: “However, in following rules… the motivating factor need not be any concern 
about the well-being of others…, but simply following an established rule.” 
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calculus on which rational choice theory focuses, human action is governed by a calculus 
of advantage that operates at the level at which behavioral dispositions are shaped in light 
of accumulated direct and indirect experiences.21 Like rational choice theory a rule-
oriented approach is ‘utilitarian’ in the sense of explaining human behavior in 
‘instrumental’ terms, as a means for achieving desired outcomes. The difference between 
the two approaches parallels the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-
utilitarianism. Rational choice theory looks at single actions as instruments for bringing 
about preferred outcomes. It explains actions in terms of the agent’s forward-looking 
calculation of expected payoffs. By contrast, a rule-oriented approach looks at rules of 
actions as instruments or ‘tools’ for bringing about preferred patterns of outcomes. It 
explains single actions in terms of an agent’s behavioral dispositions, and it explains 
these dispositions in turn in a backward-looking manner, i.e. in terms of past experiences, 
both direct and indirect. 
 As agents adopt dispositions to follow rules of action they will presumably 
experience emotional consequences from complying with or going against their 
behavioral inclinations. They may, for instance, feel uneasy if they ‘deviate’ from rules 
they are disposed to act on. Since these emotional consequences may appear to be like 
other consequences agents consider in their choice of actions, one might be inclined to 
conclude that behavioral dispositions can, after all, be accounted for by rational choice 
analysis as components in agents’ utility functions. Such a conclusion would disregard, 
however, the essential fact that the very point of being disposed to follow rules is to act in 
certain ways in certain types of situation without considering the expected consequences 
in each instance. To be sure, agents may on occasion deliberately act against their rule-
following inclinations, giving less weight to the ‘bad conscience’ from rule-violation than 
to the benefits it promises. And there are surely cases of calculated rule-compliance 
where agents consider the benefits to be had from rule-violation insufficient to 
compensate for the uneasiness felt from acting against their dispositions. Yet these cases 
are the very instances in which agents shift from a rule-following mode to situational, 
case-by-case choice, even if their situational calculus includes the emotional implications 
                                                 
21  I shall return below (section 6) to the issue of how the ‘calculus of advantage’ at the level of 
behavioral rules operates. 
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of their behavioral dispositions. They definitely do not represent the ‘standard’ cases of 
rule-following, i.e. the cases in which behavioral dispositions induce agents to act on 
preconceived notions of appropriate behavior without calculating the expected payoffs 
from potential alternative courses of action. It is these cases, however, that do not fit the 
rational choice model. 
 
5. The Rationale of Rule-Following Behavior 
At the heart of F.A. Hayek’s theoretical contributions is the argument that the inherent 
limitations of our knowledge and our powers of reason require us to rely on the guidance 
of rules if we are successfully to live our lives and to coordinate our actions with others 
in a complex world. The “whole rationale of the phenomenon of rule-guided action” is, as 
he submits, to be found in our “inescapable ignorance of most of the particular 
circumstances which determine the effects of our actions” (Hayek 1976: 20). Faced with 
the “inexhaustible totality of everything,” so Hayek (1979: 121) argues, we would soon 
be incapacitated if we were to decide each case on its own merits, as rational choice 
theory would have it.22 Due to “our constitutional ignorance” (ibid.: 8) we cannot but rely 
on rules that in the past have proven – in our own experience or the experience of others, 
including our ancestors’ – to be helpful in dealing with recurrent problems of the kind we 
are likely to encounter in the environments in which we operate. 
 Rules facilitate, Hayek explains, the making of decisions in complex situations. 
They “limit our range of choice” (1967: 90) by abbreviating the “list of circumstances 
which we need to take into account in the particular instances, singling out certain classes 
of facts as alone determining the general kind of action which we should take” (Hayek 
1964: 11). The fact that rules abbreviate what we need to take into account and limit our 
range of choice means, of course, that they lead us to disregard facts which we may well 
know and to leave potential courses of action unconsidered. As Hayek notes, why  such 
disregarding of facts and limiting of choice should help us make better decisions, is far 
                                                 
22  V. L. Smith (2003: 468): „It is necessary to constantly remind ourselves that human activity is 
diffused and dominated by unconscious, automatic, neuropsychological systems that enable people to 
function effectively without always calling upon the brain’s scarcest resource – attentional and reasoning 
circuitry. This is an important economizing property of how the brain works. If it were otherwise, no one 
could get through the day under the burden of the self-conscious monitoring and planning of every trivial 
action in detail.” 
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from being intuitively obvious. Yet this apparent paradox can be explained, he states, by 
the very “necessity of coming to terms with our unalterable ignorance of much that would 
be relevant if we knew it” (1964: 12).23 
 Because it is impossible to act “in full consideration of all the facts of a particular 
situation” (1973: 30), so he reasons, we cannot but act on the basis of selective 
knowledge, i.e. considering only a fraction of the innumerable potentially relevant facts. 
The issue is, therefore, which mode of selection promises to render overall more 
preferable outcomes: the selectivity inherent in situational, case-by-case choices, or the 
selectivity of rules? And, as Hayek argues, the latter may well be superior to the former 
(1964: 12) insofar as acting on suitable rule may, on balance, result in a more favorable 
pattern of outcomes than discretionary case-by-case choice.24 
 In a somewhat more formal manner, Ronald A. Heiner (1983) has essentially 
made the same argument as Hayek concerning the rationale of rule-following behavior. 
Heiner takes as benchmark the notion of a perfect agent, i.e. an agent who is able to 
determine with perfect reliability what, considering all circumstances, is the maximizing 
choice in each and every situation. For such an agent, Heiner argues, case-by-case 
maximization would obviously be the best policy. To the extent, however, that an agent is 
not perfect, in the sense defined, he may possibly fare better overall by adopting rules for 
how to behave in recurring problem-situations, even though rule following will inevitably 
on occasion result in less than optimal outcomes. The relevant comparison here is, of 
course, between, on the one side, the risk of – and the expected damage from – choosing 
a ‘wrong’ alternative while attempting to maximize case by case, and, on the other side, 
the risk of – and the expected damage from – missing out on ‘preferred exceptions’ when 
following a rule. The first risk is correlated with what Heiner calls the ‘competence’ of 
the agent, where competence is defined relative to the difficulty or complexity of the 
                                                 
23  F.A. Hayek (1960: 66): “Though it sounds paradoxical to say that in order to make ourselves act 
rationally we often find it necessary to be guided by habit rather than reflection, or to say that to prevent 
ourselves from making the wrong decision we must deliberately reduce the range of choice before us, we 
all know that this is often necessary in practice if we are to achieve our long-range aims.” 
24  Where the ‘balance of advantage’ is in favor of following a rule, “an apparent striving after 
rationality in the sense of fuller taking into account all the foreseeable consequences” may, as Hayek (1964: 
12) argues, result in “greater irrationality, less effective taking into account of remote effects and an 
altogether less coherent result.” 
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decision-problem. The second risk is a function of the nature or ‘quality’ of the rule in 
question. Accordingly, whether rule following may in fact be superior to attempted 
case-by-case maximization will depend on the combined effects of i) the complexity of 
the problem-situation, ii) the competence of the agent and, iii) the nature or ‘quality’ of 
the behavioral rule. 
 An imperfect agent apparently faces the problem of finding a proper balance 
between two ‘imperfections’: The imperfectness of his own choice, and the imperfectness 
of the decision-rule which he applies.  The maxim ‘always choose the best alternative’ 
would obviously generate optimal outcomes, if it could be reliably administered. But it 
need not be the best strategy for an imperfect agent who is unable to choose optimally 
with perfect reliability. He may fare better with an imperfect rule, but one which he can 
apply more reliably. The degree of  ‘imperfectness’ of a rule can be defined in terms of 
the frequency of cases in which deviating from the rule would be preferable to the agent 
or – stated differently – in terms of the rate of preferred exceptions. It will in general be 
the case that simpler rules are more imperfect, have a higher rate of ‘preferred 
exceptions’ than more complex rules.25 But for the same reason - namely their simplicity 
- they can be applied more reliably. And what matters to imperfect agents is the 
combined product of the two aspects.  
 Hayek’s and Heiner’s arguments are about the rationale of rule-following 
behavior. They identify reasons why it may be ‘rational’ – in the sense of serving their 
interests – for imperfect agents to follow rules instead of acting in a discretionary, case-
by-case manner. Whether rule following will in fact result in patterns of outcomes that 
are preferable to what discretionary case-by-case choice would generate depends, of 
course, on the nature of the rules that are followed. Rules will differ in their ‘quality’ and 
one can easily imagine rules which would be clearly inferior to case-by-case choice. 
Furthermore, among the rules which ‘work better’ some will tend to generate more 
advantageous patterns of outcomes than others. This raises the question of how agents 
come to adopt rules at all, and how they come to adopt certain kinds of rules rather than 
others. 
                                                 
25  Since rules can be translated into “if … then”-statements their complexity can be interpreted as a 
function of the specifications or qualifications enumerated in their “if”-clauses and / or their “when”-
clauses. 
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6. The Explanation of Rule-Following Behavior 
Explaining the rationale of rule-following is, of course, not the same as explaining why it 
is that agents actually do follow rules and why they follow certain rules rather than 
others. Human agents cannot choose to adopt rules in the same manner in which they can 
choose among alternative courses of action. They cannot simply ‘switch off’ their 
capacity for discretionary choice, nor would they have the cognitive abilities to reliably 
choose the rules that may serve their interests best. The disposition that defines rule-
following behavior – namely not to calculate in a case-by-case manner – is a matter of 
habit formation and not a trait one can simply decide to adopt because one recognizes its 
advantages.26 The very limits of knowledge and reason that require imperfect agents to 
rely on rules deprive them likewise of the ability to reliably anticipate the relative merits 
of potential alternative rules of action. In fact, predicting which rules from the unlimited 
universe of conceivable alternatives will produce more advantageous outcome patterns 
over time than others presents imperfect agents with an even more daunting challenge 
than anticipating and comparing the prospective payoffs from the limited set of choice 
options they confront on a particular occasion. 
 Accordingly, when I said above that behavioral dispositions are based on a 
‘calculus of advantage’ this is, of course, not meant to imply that they are the product of 
deliberate calculation. It is meant to say that the process in which dispositions are formed 
must include some ‘method of accounting’ that keeps track of the comparative 
performance of different behavioral practices in different types of situations, i.e. of how 
well they work in helping agents to cope with recurrent problems of the kind they are 
likely to encounter in the type of environment in which they operate. In the remainder of 
this section, I shall take a look at a research perspectives, the common thrust of which is 
that such ‘method of accounting’ can in fact be identified at three levels: the level of 
biological evolution, the level of cultural evolution, and the level of individual learning. 
The processes of learning or ‘accumulation of knowledge’ that operate at these three 
levels are seen to be governed by the same general evolutionary principle, the principle of 
                                                 
26  David Gauthier’s (1986) concept of “constrained maximization” and Edward F. McClennen’s 
(2004) concept of “resolute choice” entail the claim that rational agents can choose to become rule-
followers on account of their insight into the advantages to be expected thereof. For a critical examination 
of this claim see e.g. J. Dreier (2004: 164ff.) and Vanberg (1994: 54ff.). 
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trial and error elimination or variation and selective retention, even if the specific modes 
of their operation may be quite different. 
 Rules can assist agents in dealing with recurrent problems because they 
incorporate knowledge about relevant contingencies in the agents’ typical environment. 
The issue of how the acquisition of such knowledge can be explained is the subject of 
K.R. Popper’s evolutionary theory of the growth of knowledge. All behavior, so Popper 
(1982: 150) argues, is about problem solving, and all problem solving is guided by pre-
existing expectations or conjectural knowledge about the world, knowledge that is 
incorporated in agents’ “action programmes” (Popper and Eccles 1983: 134) or their 
“dispositions to act” (ibid.: 130).27 It is, as Popper stresses, only in light of its repertoire 
of expectations that a living being can perceive problems, and it is only on the basis of its 
conjectural knowledge or dispositions that it can act or respond to the problems it faces 
(Popper 1976: 139).28 Since, in this sense, all perception and action occurs on the basis of 
pre-existing conjectural knowledge or dispositions, an agent’s acquisition of knowledge 
or learning can only consist in the modification or correction of pre-existing 
expectations, dispositions or action programs.29 In Popper’s (1972: 71) terms: “All 
acquired knowledge, all learning, consists of the modification ... of some form of 
knowledge, or disposition, which was there previously, and in the last instance of inborn 
expectations.”30 Learning consists in the “tentative variation of theories or action 
programmes and their critical testing, by using them in our actions” (Popper and Eccles 
1983: 134).  As Popper emphasizes, his suggested outlook at the acquisition of 
                                                 
27  Popper and Eccles (1983: 130): “Our unconscious knowledge can well be described as a set of 
dispositions to act, or to behave, or to expect.” – “We act on the basis of action programmes” (ibid.: 132). 
28  Popper and Eccles (1983: 134f.): “All observations … are interpretations in the light of theories. 
… There is no sense organ in which anticipatory theories are not genetically incorporated. … Thus our 
sense organs are products of adaptation – they can be said to be theories, or to incorporate theories.” 
29  Popper and Eccles (1983: 132): “Learning by experience consists in modifying our expectations 
and theories and our action programmes. It is a process of modification and of selection, especially by the 
refutation of our expectations. … We learn by modifying our theories or our action programmes by 
selection, that is to say, by trial and by the elimination of error.” 
30  Popper and Eccles (1983: 121): “There are two great sources of our information: that which is 
acquired through genetic inheritance and that which is acquired throughout our life. Moreover all 
knowledge, whether inherited or acquired, is historically a modification of earlier knowledge; and all 
knowledge can be traced back, step by step, to modifications of inborn or instinctive knowledge.” – Popper 
(1972: 347): “Ontogenetically (that is, with respect to the development of the individual organism) we thus 
regress to the state of the expectations of a newborn child; phylogenetically (with respect to the evolution 
of the race, the phylum) we get to the state of expectations of unicellular organisms. … There is, as it were, 
only one step from the amoeba to Einstein.” 
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knowledge can be viewed as a “Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge” (Popper 
1972: 262).31 It is an approach that he regards as equally applicable “to animal 
knowledge, pre-scientific knowledge, and to scientific knowledge” (Popper 1972: 261), 
notwithstanding the obvious differences that may otherwise set these quite distinct levels 
of knowledge apart.32  
Popper’s theory of the growth of knowledge is counted among the founding 
contributions to the research paradigm of evolutionary epistemology,33 along with 
contributions by F.A. Hayek and Ernst Mayr that also deserve to be briefly considered 
here.34 In his The Sensory Order – An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical 
Psychology (1952), as well as in some of his other writings on epistemological issues 
(1967a,b,c,d; 1978; 1979: 31ff.), Hayek has outlined a theory of the human mind that is 
very much compatible with Popper’s evolutionary account. In Hayek’s account, it is 
through the mind’s “internal representations” of the outer world – through models, rules 
or dispositions35 – that all human perception as well as human action is guided, from our 
pre- or sub-conscious adaptations to our most deliberate and reflected responses to 
problems (Hayek 1952: 86f.; 145f.; 1967c: 45). Like Popper, Hayek views the conjectural 
knowledge that the “internal representations” embody as the product of a process of trial-
and-error elimination. More specifically, he interprets the process through which mental 
                                                 
31  Popper (1972: 142): "Epistemology becomes ... the theory of the growth of knowledge. It 
becomes the theory of problem solving or, in other words, of the construction ... and critical testing of 
competing conjectural theories." 
32  Popper and Eccles (1983: 133): “On all three levels of adaptation (the genetic level, the 
behavioral level, the level of scientific theory formation) adaptive changes always start from some given 
structure. … But the new adaptive changes in the inherited structure happen on all three levels by way of 
natural selection: by way of competition, and of the elimination of unfit trials.” 
33  The name “evolutionary epistemology” appears to have been coined by Donald T. Campbell 
(1974). According to Campbell, the central tenet of this research program is that all processes that lead to 
an expansion of knowledge or problem-solving capacity can be interpreted as instances of the "variation 
and selective retention process of evolutionary adaptation" (ibid.: 450f.), whether they occur at the level of 
genetic evolution, individual learning or cultural evolution. 
34  In his survey of the field W.W. Bartley (1987: 20f.) lists K.R. Popper, F.A. Hayek, D.T. 
Campbell, E. Mayr and  K. Lorenz as “founders.”  
35  Hayek uses the terms ‘models,’ ‘rules’ and ‘dispositions’ alternatively to describe the mental 
events that take place “between the input of (external and internal) stimuli and the output of action” (Hayek 
1982: 288). – While in The Sensory Order he mostly speaks of ‘models,’ in later publications he prefers to 
speak of “rules of action (or dispositions)” (Hayek 1978: 43). As he notes: “(D)ispositions toward kinds of 
movements can be regarded as adaptations to typical features of the environment, and the ‘recognition’ of 
such features as the activiation of the kind of disposition adapted to them. ...  (A)ll the ‘knowledge’ of the 
external world which such an organism possesses consists in the action patterns which the stimuli tend to 
evoke. ... (W)hat we call knowledge is primarily a system of rules of action” (ibid.: 41). 
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models, rules or dispositions become better adapted to the problem environment as a 
process of classification and reclassification that is controlled by success and failure 
(Hayek 1952: 147).36 In Hayek’s account, the evolution of the mental order proceeds as a 
continuous reorganization of the classificatory apparatus in light of which external events 
are interpreted, at the level of biological evolution as well as at the level of behavioral 
learning (Hayek 1952: 107f.; 1967c: 52). While the ‘knowledge’ that has been 
accumulated over the evolutionary history of our species is incorporated, as genetically 
coded conjectures, in our sense (and other) organs, the capability of learning allows an 
organism to accumulate experience-based problem-solving knowledge over its lifetime 
that is incorporated in memory-coded models, rules or dispositions (Hayek 1952: 53, 106, 
108, 129ff., 166; 1967c: 51). 
Biologist Ernst Mayr has proposed a theory of “teleonomic,” or goal-directed, 
behavior that attributes the capacity of organisms to solve the problems they face to 
“programs” that guide their behavior (Mayr 1992: 127). A “program,” in the sense Mayr 
uses the term, is “a set of instructions” (ibid.: 128) that embodies knowledge about 
relevant properties of the problem-environment. The focus of Mayr’s theory is, in his 
terms, on the encoding and decoding of the internal models or programs on which 
problem-solving behavior is based. Encoding is about the processes through which 
programs are “recorded” in an organism. It is about the manner in which programs are 
stored, and about the ways in which they become adapted to the kind of problem 
environment in which the individual operates. It is governed by feedback processes that 
establish a link between the effects of programmed instructions and their future role in 
guiding behavior. Since programs can be viewed as stored knowledge of the world, 
encoding can be seen as a process of learning: experience is used to “improve” the 
program-repertoire, i.e. to make it a more suitable guide to successful problem solving. 
Decoding is about how programs are implemented in, or applied to, particular choice 
situations. It is a matter of information processing: information retrieved from the current 
                                                 
36  About the general outlook he adopted in The Sensory Order, Hayek has noted in retrospect that he 
was led “to interpret the central nervous system as an apparatus of multiple classification or, better, as a 
process of continuous and simultaneous classification and constant reclassification on many levels (of the 
legion of impulses proceeding in it at any moment), applied in the first instance to all sensory perception 
but in principle to all kinds of mental entities, such as emotions, concepts, images, drives, etc., that we find 
to occur in the mental universe” (1982: 289).  
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(internal and external) situation and information stored in the program-repertoire is 
processed and translated into action.37 According to Mayr, all encoding processes can be 
said to be based on “natural selection” in the sense that all programs, genetically encoded 
as well as memory-encoded learned programs, are selected by their consequences.38 
Programs that generate “successful” problem-solving behavior are reinforced and 
retained, those that systematically lead to less conducive outcomes lose strength and are 
eventually abandoned. Even though the particular feedback mechanisms that implement 
such “natural selection” are surely different in genetic evolution and in individual 
learning, the general principle of “selection by consequences” is the same. 
An instructive attempt to model in a more formal manner the process of program-
adaptation and behavioral learning to which Popper’s, Hayek’s and Mayr’s evolutionary 
accounts refer is John H. Holland’s theory of “adaptive agents,” i.e. agents who adapt the 
repertoire of rules on which they act to the contingencies of their environment “as 
experience accumulates” (Holland 1995: 10). By contrast to a theory that is “built around 
agents of perfect rationality – agents that perfectly foresee the consequences of their 
actions, including the reactions of other agents” (ibid.: 85) – Holland characterizes his 
theory as an “evolutionary approach to learning” (1996: 282). Adaptive agents owe their 
“ability to anticipate” (Holland 1992b: 20) to the rules on which they operate, “rules that 
anticipate the consequences of certain responses” (ibid.), and that can be “viewed as 
hypotheses that are undergoing testing and confirmation” (Holland 1995: 53). The 
principal focus of Holland’s theory is on the process by which adaptive agents manage to 
improve their repertoire of rules and, thereby, to increase their capability to deal 
successfully with the kinds of problems they are confronted with. The process in which 
adaptive agents improve the internal models that guide their problem-solving efforts is 
explicitly modeled as an evolutionary process of variation and selection by 
consequences.39 There always exists a set of rules upon which selection can operate and 
from which new rules are continuously generated, due to random mutation and, more 
                                                 
37  Mayr (1988: 51): “The translation of programs into teleonomic behavior is greatly affected both 
by sensory inputs and by internal physiological (largely hormonal) states.” 
38  Mayr (1988: 45): “Each particular program is the result of natural selection, constantly adjusted 
by the selective value of the achieved end point, ... (whether) through a slow process of gradual selection, 
or even through individual learning or conditioning ... .” 
39  Holland (1995: 53): “That is, rules amount to alternative, competing hypotheses. When one 
hypothesis fails, competing rules are waiting in the wings to be tried.” 
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importantly, through re-combination of components of existing rules. In order for 
selection to systematically favor ‘beneficial’ and to work against ‘inferior’ rules, a 
feedback or accounting mechanism must be in place that assigns ‘credit’ to behavioral 
practices according to the contribution they make to an agent’s ability to operate 
successfully in the environment that he faces. The method of “credit assignment”40 that 
serves this function must, in particular, be able to give proper credit to behavioral 
practices or rules that are not themselves followed by immediate rewards, but rather serve 
in a stage-setting role in the sense of being part of extended chains of actions only the last 
links of which are directly ‘rewarded.’41 
It is a significant achievement of Holland’s approach that it specifies a model of 
how such credit assignment operates, called the “bucket brigade algorithm” (Holland 
1995: 56; 1992a: 176ff.), a model the general thrust of which can be captured by the 
metaphor of a market in which not only the final sellers of products are rewarded by the 
price paid by consumers, but in which the revenue raised in the final product market is 
transferred back to the producers of inputs for these products, to the producers of inputs 
for the production of inputs, and so on. Thus, ‘stage setting’ productive activities upon 
which success in the final product market depends are encouraged, while failure in the 
final stage translates into inability to reward suppliers of inputs. In similar ways the 
“bucket brigade algorithm” models the ways in which adaptive agents carry on a 
“calculus of advantage” at the level of rules of action that assigns credit to – and thus 
strengthens – rules according to their respective contribution to the agents’ overall 
success in solving the problems they encounter in their environments (Holland 1996: 
285f.). As Holland (ibid.) emphasizes, the “bucket brigade algorithm” makes manageable 
a task that otherwise would surely be beyond the capacity of boundedly rational agents, 
namely the task of keeping track of the success record of a complex repertoire of rules 
that are activated, in varying combinations, as components of internal models of current 
problem-situations.  
                                                 
40  Holland (1995: 53): “We want to assign each rule a strength that, over time, comes to reflect the 
rule’s usefulness to the system. The procedure for modifying strength on the basis of experience is often 
called credit assignment.”  
41  Holland et al. (1986: 16): “Credit assignment is not particularly difficult when the system receives 
payoffs from the environment for a particular action – the system simply strengthens all the rules active at 
that time (a kind of conditioning). Credit assignment becomes difficult when credit must be assigned to 
early-acting rules that set the stage for a sequence of actions leading to payoff.” 
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Holland’s concept of “credit assignment” can be related to what above I have 
described, somewhat informally, as preferences over actions. In Holland’s “bucket 
brigade algorithm” the credits assigned to particular rules determine the strength of an 
agent’s inclination or disposition to act on them. Conversely, the strength of an agent’s 
dispositional ‘commitment’ to rules is a function of the ‘credits’ assigned to the 
respective practices over the agent’s past behavioral history. What I have called an 
agent’s “preferences over actions” can, in this sense, be interpreted as the product of 
learning processes – including the processes of biological and cultural evolution – in 
which experiences with the capacity of alternative behavioral practices to further the 
agent’s wellbeing have been accumulated and have been ‘condensed’ in the agent’s 
dispositional attachment to the respective practices, i.e. the strength of his inclination to 
act in certain ways in certain types of situations.  
For agents to develop dispositions to follow rules does not mean, of course, that 
they become entirely oblivious to the overall incentive structure of the choice situations 
they are facing, responding only to the ‘clues’ that let them classify a given situation as 
one to which a particular rule applies. Even though human behavior, including moral 
conduct, is surely ‘routinized’ to a large extent in the sense that much of our everyday 
conduct is carried out semi-automatically and without any involvement of conscious 
deliberation, we cannot, as noted before, simply ‘switch off’ our capacity for rational 
calculation, and anything unusual in the choice situations we encounter may activate this 
capacity. The ‘function’ or ‘evolutionary rationale’ of the fact, mentioned above, that 
emotional consequences tend to be associated with following or deviating from rules that 
one is disposed to act on may well lie exactly in the role they play in ‘stabilizing’ our 
rule-following dispositions in the face of opposing situational incentives.42 The conflict 
that persons experience in such situations is not about a trade-off between different 
elements in the utility function as is suggested by authors who treat concerns for equity, 
                                                 
42  The role of emotions in human decision making has recently found growing attention in 
economics (Frank 1988; Elster 1996, 1998; Loewenstein 2000; van Winden 2001; Bosman, Sutter and van 
Winden 2005). What is of particular interest in the context of the present paper is that in this literature two 
different interpretations of the role of emotions are discussed: on the one hand, their role “as psychic costs 
or benefits that enter into the utility function on a par with satisfaction derived from material rewards” 
(Elster 1998: 64) and, on the other hand, their role as “an action tendency” (ibid.: 99), as a “pattern or 
readiness, which is the urge to execute a particular form of action or to abstain from a particular action” 
(Bosman, Sutter and van Winden 2005: 412). 
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fairness and the like as preferences over outcomes. Instead, it is a conflict between 
agents’ preferences for acting according to rules that the above discussed ‘accounting 
mechanism’ tells them work well in situations of the type currently encountered, and their 
preferences for outcomes that their situational calculation tells them they may achieve by 
deviating. The intensity of this conflict will depend on the strength of their dispositional 
commitments versus the attractiveness of the outcomes that they expect from rule 
violation.43 
 
7. Conclusion 
Contrasting, as I have done in this paper, rational choice theory and a theory of rule-
following behavior raises the question of the relation between the two perspectives. Are 
they to be considered as fundamentally disjunct and mutually exclusive outlooks at 
behavior, or can they be integrated into a coherent, unified theory of human conduct? If 
we acknowledge, as we surely must, that both, forward-looking calculated choice as well 
as backward-looking dispositions to follow rules, are relevant aspects of human behavior 
– that, as Hayek puts it in the quotation chosen as motto for this paper, “man is as much a 
rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one” – it would certainly be unsatisfactory to 
assign the study of these aspects to two entirely separated conceptual frameworks. The 
natural ambition of scientific inquiry would seem to be to come up with a unified theory 
of human behavior that accounts for its more calculative as well as for its more rule-
guided versions in terms of one coherent set of explanatory principles. 
 There appear to be two principal candidates for attempts at providing such an 
integrated theoretical outlook. One can either seek to show that what we classify as rule-
following behavior can in fact be integrated in a properly adjusted rational choice 
framework. Under the rubric “Adjusting the Utility-Function” I have discussed and 
criticized an example of this strategy in section 3. The other candidate for a strategy of 
theoretical integration is to show that what we classify as rational, calculated choice can 
in fact be accounted for by a properly interpreted theory of rule-following behavior. It is 
in support of this second strategy that I want to provide a few concluding comments. 
                                                 
43  The function of emotions in ‘stabilizing’ rule-following behavior has been discussed in detail by 
Robert Frank (1988) under the rubric of “emotions as commitment devices.” 
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 Rational choice theory ascribes our capacity for forward-looking problem solving 
to the fact that we are rational beings, without bothering to explain where the knowledge 
that supposedly defines our ‘rationality’ comes from. By contrast, the common thrust of 
the theoretical approaches that I have discussed in the previous section is twofold. It is, 
first, that the knowledge that guides our problem-solving efforts can be derived from no 
other sources than past experiences, be it the experiences that our species accumulated 
over its evolutionary history or be it the experiences that we, as individuals, have 
accumulated over our lifetime, on the basis of our genetic inheritance and in the context 
of a social environment that in turn has been shaped by experiences accumulated in the 
process of socio-cultural evolution. And it is, second, that such experience-based 
knowledge can exist in no other form than as ‘conjectures’ or ‘programs’ that are stored, 
as encoded information, in our genes and in our memories.  
 If, as Popper, Hayek, Mayr and Holland assert, all problem-solving behavior is 
based on pre-existing conjectures, programs or rules then – by distinguishing between 
rational choice and rule-following behavior – we cannot mean that only the latter is 
program-guided while as rational choosers we can do without the guidance of experience-
based conjectural knowledge. The distinction can only be about the degree to which we 
consciously rely on the knowledge incorporated in memory-stored programs or 
conjectures as opposed to habitual, unreflected rule following. There surely is a 
significant difference between situations in which we explicitly consider the alternative 
choice options available to us, carefully weighing the consequences to be expected from 
each of them, and situations in which we solve recurrent problems in a routine manner, 
often without any awareness of what we are doing. Yet, even the most deliberated and 
calculated choices we make are ‘program-based’ in the sense that they employ memory-
coded conjectural knowledge of relevant contingencies in the world around us. 
Furthermore, as Hayek (1976: 56) notes, “even decisions which have been carefully 
considered will in part be determined by rules of which the acting person is not aware.” 
 Thus, rather than thinking of rational choice and rule-following behavior as two 
categorically different modes of human conduct, it is, as I submit, more appropriate to 
think of them as part of a continuum, along which program-based problem solving can 
vary from entirely unconscious rule following to highly calculated conjecture-based 
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choice.44 This is not to deny that humans may also act in entirely novel ways, unaided by 
their evolved repertoires of conjectures, rules and programs. Yet, as notably D.T. 
Campbell (1987) has stressed, it means to recognize that, where our problem-solving 
efforts go beyond what the knowledge incorporated in our repertoire of programs can 
teach us, we cannot go but blindly. Such genuinely ‘non-programmed’ choices cannot be 
‘rational’ in the sense of benefiting from pre-knowledge of what may be successful 
strategies for dealing with the problem that is addressed. It is worth noting in conclusion 
what Herbert A. Simon, whose name has figured more prominently than anybody else’s 
in the debate on the limits of the economic model of rational choice, has commented on 
this issue. In the context of his theory of bounded rationality45 he draws a distinction 
between “programmed” decisions46 and “non-programmed” decisions (Simon 1982: 
380), but he hastens to add that, ultimately, all decisions rely on ‘internal models’ and 
are, in this sense, program-based, even if they may be “non-programmed” in the sense 
that “processes of innovation” (ibid.: 393) and “the construction of new programs” (ibid.: 
396) are initiated when existing programs fail to lead to successful problem solving. As 
Simon (ibid.: 380) puts it: “Are there any decisions, then, that are not programmed? If we 
want to be literal, … any sequence of events in which each event is determined in some 
way by the whole collection of its antecedents is ‘programmed.’ In these terms, even 
searching through a haystack for a needle is programmed choice – and perhaps it is.” 
 
 
  
 
.  
 
                                                 
44  For a critical discussion of this view see J. Vromen (2004: 14ff.). 
45  Simon (1984: 47f.): “In any realistic description of the environment of a human decision maker, 
the variables and information to which he might attend … are innumerable. The hypothesis of bounded 
rationality claims that human beings handle this difficulty by attending to only a small part of the 
complexity about them. They make a highly simplified model of the world, and they make their decisions 
in terms of that model and the subset of variables that enter into it.” 
46  Simon (1982: 389): “We should view programmed decision-making as a process for making 
choices within the framework set by highly simplified models of real-world problems.” 
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